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Abstract 
It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the ‘intentional 
binding’ effect (Haggard et al, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective 
compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory 
consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating 
array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the 
promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional 
binding, focusing, in particular, on the link between intentional binding and the sense of 
agency (the experience of controlling action to influence events in the environment). We 
suggest that, whilst it is yet to be fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and 
the sense of agency is compelling. We conclude by considering outstanding questions and 
future directions for research on intentional binding.  
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1. Introduction 
Humans are agents. That is, they have the capacity to bring about change in the external 
world through their own goal-directed behaviour. Often, humans also have a corresponding 
conscious experience of this capacity, which is referred to as the ‘sense of agency’. A key 
challenge for scientific investigations of the sense of agency is the discovery and use of 
appropriate measures. In 2002, Haggard and colleagues introduced a novel measure of the 
sense of agency based on an intriguing relationship between voluntary action and subjective 
time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002;  Haggard, Aschersleben, et al., 2002). This so-
called ‘intentional binding’ measure has generated considerable interest and has been used in 
a number of experiments on the sense of agency. However, as a measure of the sense of 
agency it is not without its detractors (e.g. Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). We therefore feel 
that the time is right for a review of experiments using intentional binding to study the sense 
of agency. We first provide a brief historical background to the use of subjective time in 
experimental psychology. We begin by introducing Benjamin Libet’s seminal work and the 
‘clock methodology’ he used (which forms the basis of the original intentional binding 
paradigm). Having set the scene we then review experiments using the intentional binding 
paradigm. We conclude this review by considering a) the validity of intentional binding as a 
measure of the sense of agency, and b) future directions for research.  
 
1.1. The use of subjective time in Experimental Psychology: Libet’s work on volition 
 
Measures based on the subjective experience of time have a long history in Experimental 
Psychology. In the 1880s Wilhelm Wundt developed his complication-clock apparatus to 
explore the time course of attention (Figure 1). Participants had to orient to a clock (or 
pendulum) when presented with a certain stimulus (such as an auditory click) and report the 
onset of that stimulus by noting the position of the clock hand (or pendulum) when the 
stimulus occurred. Wundt observed systematic differences in the perceived onset of the 
auditory stimulus: People either perceived the auditory event earlier or later relative to the 
position of the clock hand (or pendulum). Moreover, this difference was attributed to whether 
participants were attending to the clock hand or or the auditory stimulus. Wundt’s 
chronometric methodology thus provides an invaluable tool for comparing subjective and 
objective stimulus onset timings.  
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Figure 1. The complication-clock apparatus developed by Wundt. 
 
In the 1980s Benjamin Libet adopted Wundt’s classic methodology to explore human 
volition. In Libet et al’s (1983) seminal study, participants sat in front of a clock face marked 
at regular intervals. During each trial a spot rotated around the clock-face at a speed of 1 
revolution every 2.56s. Participants used the clock to judge the onset of certain events. In one 
condition participants flexed their wrist when they felt the urge, and judged the time they 
became aware of raising their hand. In a second condition participants again flexed their wrist 
when they felt the urge, and this time they judged the time they became aware of their 
conscious intention to raise their hand. In a third condition, a somatosensory stimulus was 
applied at an unpredictable time during the trial and participants judged the time that they felt 
this stimulus. To make these timing judgements participants reported the position of the spot 
on the clock face when they were perceived the event (intention, action or somatosensory 
stimulus). Libet and colleagues concurrently used electroencephalography (EEG) to record 
the readiness potential, a cascade of neural activity that reliably precedes the onset of 
voluntary movement. Libet found that, judgements of movements were slightly early 
compared to actual movement onset, whereas judgements of somatosensory stimuli were 
slightly delayed compared to their actual onset. Famously, although intentions were 
perceived as occurring prior to movements, they lagged behind the onset of the readiness 
potential. This suggests that the intention to act may arise after the brain has initiated an 
action. The implications of this work have been extensively discussed elsewhere. What is 
most relevant to the current paper is the ‘clock methodology’ that Libet used as it formed the 
basis of the original work on intentional binding, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
1.2. Original experiment and some basic conditions for intentional binding 
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In the first journal article to report the intentional binding effect, Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras 
(2002) used the Libet clock method (see earlier description of this approach) to study the 
perceived time of actions and their consequent effects (see also Haggard, Aschersleben, 
Gehrke, & Prinz, 2002). There were four critical conditions in their experiment. In baseline 
conditions, participants either made voluntary actions or listened for the occurrence of an 
auditory tone (in the absence of action) while they watched a rotating clock hand on a 
computer screen. They were asked to report the position of the clock hand when they moved 
or when the tone occurred. In operant conditions, participants made a voluntary key press on 
every trial, but this time it was followed 250 ms later by an auditory tone. In specific blocks, 
participants were asked to judge either the time of their action or the time of the tone. The 
trial structure of a typical operant condition is shown in figure 2. The key comparison was the 
perceived times of actions and tones in baseline conditions with the perceived time of actions 
and tones in operant conditions. The authors found that, in operant conditions, the perceived 
time of their actions was later than in baseline conditions and the perceived time of the tone 
was earlier than in baseline conditions. Hence, the derived interval between the action and 
tone in operant conditions was compressed compared to the derived interval between these 
two events in baseline conditions. Critically, in an identical set of conditions involving 
involuntary movements induced via transcranial magnetic stimulation over the primary motor 
cortex, the binding effect was reversed such that the interval between action and effect 
actually increased in ‘operant’ conditions compared to baseline conditions. Figure 3 shows 
the classic pattern of intentional binding found in this seminal experiment. 
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Figure 2. Typical trial structure in an operant condition (following Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). 
Participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing which produced a tone after a delay of 250ms. 
Participants judged where the clock hand was when they pressed the key or when they heard the tone, in 
separate blocks of trials 
 
In a second experiment the authors varied the delay and the predictability of when the tone 
occurred after voluntary action. The results from this study indicated that temporal contiguity 
and predictability are important determinants for binding. On the basis of their findings the 
authors speculated that a specific cognitive function of the central nervous system is to bind 
together critical sensorimotor events that surround voluntary action, and that this function 
may be crucial for the normal experience of agency. There are two things to highlight about 
this early hypothesis. The first is the assumed link with sense of agency. The aim of this 
review is to scrutinise this assumption, and, while the evidence reviewed provides compelling 
support for this link, it should be noted that alternative proposals have been advanced. For 
example, intentional binding may reflect the ‘unity of perception’ (Yarrow et al., 2001) or be 
more generally linked to causality rather than agency (Stetson, Montague and Eagleman, 
2006). The second thing to highlight is that this early hypothesis suggested that binding may 
help support inferences of agency. However, as we shall see in this review, more recent 
evidence suggests that inferences of agency can also support binding (e.g. Moore & Haggard, 
2008). This serves to emphasise a recurring theme in this review; namely, that although there 
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is compelling evidence supporting a link between intentional binding and sense of agency, 
the exact nature of that relationship is yet to be fully understood 
 
 
Figure 3. The classic pattern of intentional binding described by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002).  The 
perception of onset of voluntary actions was shifted later in time and the perception of tone onset was shifted 
earlier. This was not the case for involuntary actions induced by TMS, which showed the opposite effects. 
Original figure used with permission. 
 
Since the seminal journal article on intentional binding, many studies have been performed 
using the Libet clock method. However, another, more direct method has also been 
employed, yielding confirmatory results. Specifically, citing some of the methodological 
criticisms surrounding the Libet clock method, several authors have used a direct interval 
estimation procedure in which participants are instructed to simply report the perceived 
interval (in milliseconds) between an action and effect (see Figure 4). These studies, which 
we describe in more detail later, have shown that mean interval estimates are lower 
(indicating a shorter perceived interval) in voluntary vs. Passive conditions. This temporal 
illusion is just one example of perceptual distortion surrounding voluntary action. Another 
well-known example is the spatial compression effect in which targets flashed around the 
onset of a saccade are systematically mislocalised toward the saccade landing position 
(interested readers are referred to Ross, Morrone, & Burr, 1997 for more on this fascinating 
perceptual effect). In the context of this review, we shall refer to the direct estimation of 
temporal intervals as the (direct) interval estimation approach.  
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Figure 4. Schematic showing typical trial structure for the interval estimation procedure. Participants judge 
the duration of the movement-effect interval in milliseconds. This is an alternative to the Libet clock procedure 
(see Figure 2).   
 
The original demonstration of intentional binding and the suggestion of a link to agency 
sparked considerable interest from researchers interested in the phenomenology of human 
action. The remaining sections of our review highlight some of the most significant work that 
followed the original journal article. As will be evident, intentional binding and its potential 
relationship with the sense of agency is far from fully understood, although with each 
additional experiment, a slightly clearer view of the significance of intentional binding in 
human action contexts and the factors that modulate intentional binding, is emerging. 
 
2. Prediction and retrospective inference 
 
The purported link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is perhaps the most 
tantalising aspect of the original article. To appreciate why the link was suggested, 
consideration must be given to current ideas about how the sense of agency might arise. In 
this regard, it is possible to distinguish between two theoretical positions on the 
9 
 
neurocognitive origins of the sense of agency. On the one hand there is the ‘predictive’ 
position. On this view the sense of agency is generated by processes dedicated to the control 
of voluntary action. Optimal motor control and learning require predictions of both the future 
states of the motor system and the sensory consequences of movement (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000). These predictions are derived from internal forward models, of which 
there are two classes: forward dynamic and forward sensory. The forward dynamic model 
captures the dynamics of bodily movement. The forward sensory model captures the causal 
relation between movements and their sensory consequences, generating predictions of the 
likely sensory consequences of movement based on efference copy of motor commands. 
According to the so-called, ‘comparator model’ of the sense of agency, this plays a key role 
in the sense of agency (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002): the sense of agency is produced 
when there is a match between predicted and actual sensory consequences of movement.  
 
On the other hand there are those who downplay the specific contribution of the motor 
system. Instead, it is suggested that the sense of agency is generated by a process of 
retrospective inference. On this view a general-purpose inferential mechanism uses sensory 
information to establish the causal origins of actions and their effects. One influential version 
of this position is Wegner’s ‘theory of apparent mental causation’ (Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999; Wegner, 2002; Wegner, 2003), which takes an explicitly Humean approach. According 
to this theory, the experience of willing an action arises if a thought (intention) 1) occurs 
prior to action, 2) is consistent with the action, and 3) is the most plausible cause of the 
action.   
 
This same debate, prediction vs. retrospective inference, concerns the intentional binding 
effect (Haggard & Clark, 2003). Intentional binding could be produced by dedicated motor 
control mechanisms predicting the sensory consequences of an action. Alternatively, 
intentional binding could be the result of retrospective inference triggered by the actual 
presence of the sensory consequences of movement. The apparent specificity of the binding 
effect to voluntary movement strongly implies the involvement of predictive motor processes. 
Support for this was provided by Haggard and Clark (2003), who investigated whether 
disrupting the intention to produce an action impacted on intentional binding. Participants 
made voluntary key presses whilst watching the Libet clock. In some blocks transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) was randomly applied over motor cortex.  The aim was to 
disrupt the completion of some of these intentional actions by triggering an identical 
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involuntary movement. Some actions were therefore truly intentional (the action precisely 
matched the participant’s intention) and some were not (the action did not precisely match the 
participant’s intention). Haggard and Clark found that disrupting intentions significantly 
weakened intentional binding. These results are consistent with the predictive interpretation 
of the effect: they suggest that intentional binding is supported by processes involved in the 
preparation of action. The fact that the mere co-occurrence of actions and outcomes was not 
sufficient to produce binding (in the intention disruption trials) was interpreted as evidence 
against the contribution of retrospective inference.  
 
The idea that intentional binding is supported by predictive processes involved in the 
preparation of action is supported by Tsakiris and Haggard’s (2003) study. Previous 
experiments have shown that, when the predictions of a forward model are matched by 
sensory feedback the ‘strength’ of the feedback is attenuated, and sensory effects are 
therefore subjectively experienced as less intense (e.g. Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999). 
Tsakiris & Haggard (2003) demonstrated that intentional binding occurred for actions that 
were followed by somatic effects, and also that somatic effects following action were 
experienced as less intense than those following passive movement. It should be noted that 
these effects were not correlated in this experiment rather they merely co-occurred in the 
same sample. Nevertheless, this is suggestive of a link between intentional binding and the 
operation of predictive forward models.  
 
Further support for the predictive interpretation came from a study by (Engbert & 
Wohlschläger,, 2007), which focussed on the action component of intentional binding. Using 
the Libet clock method, they assessed the impact of changing certain properties of the action 
outcome on the perceived time of action. A first experiment looked at the impact of whether 
or not an outcome was intended. Of more relevance to the current discussion on prediction, 
Experiments 2 and 3 assessed the impact of outcome probability on the perceived time of 
action. In Experiment 2,  the probability of the outcome (a tone) was manipulated, so that in 
one condition that probability was higher (80%) than in the other (20%). They found that 
actions were perceived later (i.e. intentional binding for actions was stronger) in the higher 
outcome probability condition. Interestingly, this delay in the perceived time of action was 
observed on trials with and without a tone, suggesting that the presence of the tone was not 
necessary for intentional binding. This emphasises the role of prediction in intentional 
binding: predicting the outcome was sufficient to induce binding. In a final experiment they 
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showed that this predictive effect was specific to voluntary action. When the movements 
were passively induced the perceived time of these movements did not significantly differ in 
the high and low outcome probability conditions. Engbert and Wohlschläger,’s study 
provides convincing evidence in support of the role of prediction in intentional binding, 
showing that intentional binding is sensitive to whether or not an outcome is predicted. 
Moreover, the mechanisms providing these contributions to intentional binding seem to be 
specifically motoric.  
 
Moore and Haggard (2008) also investigated the contribution of prediction and retrospective 
inference to the action component of intentional binding. Participants made voluntary key-
presses while watching the Libet-clock. In one condition the outcome was predictable: the 
key press produced a tone on 75% of trials. In another condition, the outcome was 
unpredictable: the key press produced a tone on 50% of trials. Using this design, Moore and 
Haggard could isolate the contribution of predictive and retrospective inferential processes to 
action binding. The contribution of prediction was confirmed by an increase in action binding 
on ‘action only’ trials (where the key press did not produce the tone) in the 75% vs. 50% 
conditions. This increase in binding could only be due to the increase in outcome probability. 
The contribution of retrospective inference was confirmed by an increase in action binding on 
‘action + tone’ vs. ‘action only’ trials in the 50% condition. In this condition the contribution 
of prediction was minimal because the outcome was unpredictable. Therefore, the increase in 
binding on ‘action + tone’ trials could only have been due to the presence of the tone. This 
suggests that the tone retrospectively triggered a shift in the perceived time of action. In a 
follow-up analysis, the authors showed that predictive action binding – binding in the absence 
of the outcome - was modulated by the recency of reinforcement history. Only when an 
action had produced an outcome in the immediately preceding trial was there a significant 
shift in the perceived time of action on ‘action only’ trials. Overall, this study not only 
emphasises the importance of outcome prediction for intentional binding, but also provides 
the first evidence that retrospective processes are involved. Moreover, the recency effect 
suggests that learning may be important. 
 
The study by Moore and Haggard (2008) suggests that retrospective inference plays a role in 
intentional binding. In other studies of motor experience the contribution of this process has 
been shown using priming paradigms. In a seminal study, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) 
showed that simply priming participants with words consistent with an action outcome 
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increased the participants feeling of controlling the action, even though they had not actually 
made the movement. According to the authors, these primes engendered thoughts about 
action consequences, and therefore acted as surrogate intentions. The fact that these primes 
were able to modulate the participants’ feeling of control over movements they had not made 
was taken as evidence that the experience of control arises from a process that infers causal 
relations between events (intentions, actions, and outcomes). According to the authors, “this 
interpretive process is fundamentally separate from the mechanistic process of real mental 
causation”. This clearly downplays the contribution of the motor control system to the sense 
of agency.  
 
Moore, Wegner and Haggard (2009) subsequently investigated whether priming effects could 
also be shown for intentional binding using the interval estimation procedure. There were two 
movement conditions: voluntary and passive. Prior to the movement in each condition 
participants were presented with a prime: a high or low pitch tone. The movement then 
produced, after a brief delay, a high or low pitch tone. In this way, the authors were able to 
manipulate prime-outcome consistency. They found that intentional binding was increased 
when primes were congruent with the outcome. Given the putative link between intentional 
binding and the sense of agency, this finding was consistent with previous priming studies 
showing that the sense of agency was augmented for congruent primes. Despite the 
significant main effect of prime congruence, it was also found that the effect of the prime was 
significantly reduced when the movement was voluntary. This suggests that, although 
retrospective inference does play a role in intentional binding (and the sense of agency more 
broadly), its role is most important in the absence of predictive motor processes that normally 
dominate.  
 
The studies reviewed in this section show that both prediction and retrospective inference 
contribute to intentional binding. However, the study by Moore, Wegner and Haggard (2009) 
suggests that the dichotomy between prediction and retrospective inference may be too crude. 
In response to this, Moore, Wegner and Haggard (2009) suggested that the sense of agency is 
based on different agency cues (including but perhaps not limited to sensorimotor predictions 
and external action consequences) and that the relative influence of these cues is determined 
by their reliability. In this way the sense of agency may be based on a mechanism that 
optimally integrates a variety of agency cues. As will be discussed later, this model may help 
explain patterns of agency experience associated with certain diseases, such as schizophrenia.  
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3. Causality and intentional binding 
 
A number of studies have considered the role of causality in intentional binding. Causal 
inferences are likely to be based on properties of the action-outcome relation such as 
contiguity and contingency. Contiguity refers to the temporal proximity of the action and the 
outcome. The closer together in time these events appear the stronger the inferred causal 
relation (Hume, 1888). The role of contiguity in intentional binding is unclear.  Haggard, 
Clark and Kalogeras (2002) examined intentional binding at action-outcome delays of 250ms, 
450ms, and 650ms, and found that intentional binding was weaker at longer delays.  In 
contrast, Buehner and Humphreys (2009) and Humphreys and Buehner (2009) found that 
intentional binding was preserved at action-outcome delays of up to 4s.  
 
A novel take on the link between contiguity and intentional binding has also been made by 
Stetson, Montague and Eagleman (2006). Stetson et al found that when participants are 
adapted to a fixed delay between an action (key press) and a sensory consequence (colour 
flash), occasional presentation of the colour flash at a shorter delay can lead to an illusory 
reversal of the action and its sensory consequence. They suggest that this effect occurs 
because once sensory events (such as a flash of colour) are interpreted as consequences of 
actions the brain re-calibrates timing judgements to fit the prior expectation that actions and 
sensory events are contiguous. When an outcome is presented at a shorter delay, this 
recalibration can lead to an illusory reversal of action and outcome. Although their study was 
not directly concerned with intentional binding, Stetson et al also suggest that this 
recalibration mechanism underpins the intentional binding effect – reflecting the fact that the 
brain is recalibrating the timing of actions and outcomes to fit the prior expectation that these 
events should be contiguous. Stetson et al also investigated whether this recalibration 
occurred for sequences of sensory events in the absence of action. The sensory events were a 
tap applied to the finger followed by a flash of colour. Although there was numerical 
evidence suggesting the presence of illusory reversals in this condition, this was not quite 
statistically significant. This emphasises the importance of voluntary action in generating 
these shifts in perceived time.  
 
Further to its implications for the role of contiguity in intentional binding, Stetson et al’s 
study also highlights the apparent importance of contingency learning – recalibration is 
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thought to take place once a sensory event is interpreted as a consequence of moving.  Goal-
directed behaviour is mediated by contingency learning (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). 
During contingency learning, organisms acquire knowledge about the causal relation between 
actions and outcomes; the extent to which an outcome is contingent on an action. There is a 
non-contingent relation when the outcome is equally likely in the presence and absence of the 
action. There is a contingent relation when the probability of the outcome is increased in the 
presence of action. By computing contingency information, organisms are able to 
purposefully control their environment.  
 
Moore, Lagnado, Deal and Haggard (2009) investigated the relevance of contingency 
learning for intentional binding, by measuring its impact on the action component of 
intentional binding using the Libet clock method. They used the same probability 
manipulation as Moore and Haggard (2008) described above, with 75% and 50% outcome 
probability conditions. The key methodological change was that in each condition 
participants were given the choice of whether or not to press the key on each trial. The 
probability of the outcome in the absence of the key press (when subjects chose to withhold 
action) was manipulated, allowing the authors to manipulate action-outcome contingency. It 
was found that increasing action-outcome contingency significantly increased the 
contribution of predictive and retrospective inferential processes to intentional binding. This 
suggests that the occurrence of intentional binding (and the processes subserving it) is 
sensitive to the causal relation between actions and outcomes. Therefore, whilst the presence 
of intentional movement seems to be necessary for intentional binding, depending on the 
context, it may not be sufficient. 
 
Buehner and Humphreys (2009) also demonstrated the importance of contingency in 
intentional binding using a novel intentional binding paradigm. In a non-causal condition, 
participants were initially exposed to a succession of two tones (t1 and t2), thus learning that 
t2 was not contingent on action. In a causal condition participants had to press a key, which 
caused a tone (t2), thus learning that t2 was contingent on action. In a subsequent training 
phase, participants were presented with a succession of tones (t1 and t2) and had to 
synchronise a key press with t1. In the non-causal condition t2 was contingent on t1 whereas 
in the causal condition t2 was contingent on the action. In a final test phase participants were 
instructed to synchronise a key press with t1 (as before) and also synchronise a second key 
press with t2. To assess intentional binding they measured the time of these synchronised key 
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presses relative to the onset of t1 and t2. Using this novel behavioural measure they found 
that intentional binding was increased when participants were trained in the causal condition 
than when trained in the non-causal condition. This emphasises the importance of 
contingency for intentional binding:  binding was only found when the subjects learnt that the 
tone was contingent on the key press. According to the authors, these data show that causality 
is the principle factor driving intentional binding, downplaying the role of voluntary action. 
However, given the fact that intentionality was not manipulated in this study, this claim is 
rather hard to justify.  
 
Contrary to Beuhner and Humphreys we would suggest that the data reviewed so far imply 
that causality and intentionality are both necessary for binding, but neither factor is itself 
sufficient. This is supported by Cravo, Claessens, and Baldo's (2009) study in which they 
assessed the contribution of both voluntary action and causality to intentional binding. A 
Michottean launching paradigm was used. In a collision condition a first disk travelling from 
left to right collided with a second disk, launching it to the right. In a non-collision condition 
a first disk moved from the centre of the screen to the left and then a second moved from the 
centre of the screen to the right. In each condition the movement of the first disk was either 
controlled by the computer (passive) or by the participant (active).  Cravo and colleagues 
measured participants’ causal ratings and also intentional binding (using the interval 
estimation procedure). They found that causal ratings were higher in the collision condition 
for both active and passive movements. However, intentional binding was only observed in 
the collision condition and only when the movement was active. This study shows that 
neither causality nor intentionality are sufficient for intentional binding, rather both 
conditions seem to play a role. This finding is echoed by a more recent study by Cravo, 
Claessens, and Baldo (2011). They used a novel intentional binding measure based on 
perceived synchrony of an auditory consequence of action (a tone) and a visual reference (a 
flash). Intentional binding in this paradigm is revealed when participants make ‘synchrony’ 
judgements for visual references occurring prior to the auditory consequence of movement 
(indicating that they perceive the later auditory tone to be synchronous with the earlier visual 
flash). They investigated the contribution of voluntary action, predictability, and contiguity to 
intentional binding, and found that intentional binding was strongest when subjects made 
voluntary movements and the consequences of those movements were predictable and 
contiguous. The effects of contiguity and predictability were abolished in the absence of 
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voluntary movement. Again, this emphasises that both causality and intentionality are 
necessary conditions for binding (but neither are sufficient).  
 
The data reviewed in this section emphasise the importance of learning in intentional binding. 
That is, acquired knowledge of action-outcome relations impacts on intentional binding. The 
importance of learning is also recognised in certain models of the sense of agency. For 
example, according to the so-called ‘comparator model’ (described in section 2.), the sense of 
agency is informed by sensorimotor predictions generated as part of the normal system of 
motor control (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). 
Given that accurate predictions are the hallmark of successful learning, this model, at least 
implicitly, recognises the contribution of learning.  
 
Despite the apparent importance of learning in the sense of agency, few studies have 
considered the nature of this learning. This is something Moore, Dickinson, & Fletcher 
(2011) wished to address, focussing on the possible role of associative learning mechanisms. 
Central to theories of associative learning is the role of surprise or prediction error 
(Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). According to these 
theories, learning only occurs when the outcome is unexpected – if the outcome is already 
fully predicted no new learning should occur. Moore, Dickinson and Fletcher used a modified 
‘blocking’ procedure in which action-outcome associations were trained under different 
conditions of surprise. In a pre-training phase, participants freely made left or right key 
presses. These key presses each caused a specific flash of colour on the computer screen. 
Having acquired these action-colour associations participants then completed a training 
phase. In this phase, left and right key presses each caused a compound effect consisting of a 
specific flash of colour and a specific tone. For one action the resultant flash of colour was 
the same as that learned during pre-training - this represented a condition of lower surprise 
(only the tone was novel). For the other action the flash of colour was novel - this represented 
a condition of augmented surprise (both the tone and flash of colour were novel). In a test 
phase, participants made left and right key presses and only the tones from the previous 
training session were presented. Intentional binding was measured for these action-tone 
associations. It was found that intentional binding was increased when the action-tone 
association had been trained under the condition of augmented surprise. This finding is 
consistent with theories of associative learning. They also showed that the magnitude of this 
effect was negatively correlated with participants’ scores on schizotypy scales: the smaller 
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the effect of surprise on binding the higher the participant tended to scores on the schizotypy 
scales. This is an intriguing finding given the putative link between patterns of associative 
learning and dopaminergic dysfunction in patients with schizophrenia (discussed in section 
5.).  
 
Results from studies like the one above suggest that causality is an important factor in 
intentional binding. However, contrary to some suggestions, these data do not show that 
causality is sufficient for intentional binding. Instead, it appears that intentionality and 
causality need to be present for the occurrence of intentional binding. We would conclude, 
therefore, that motoric contributions to intentional binding (and the sense of agency in 
general) are embedded in a wider cognitive system that takes into account the causal structure 
of the environment. The study by Moore, Dickinson and Fletcher suggests that the acquisition 
of this causal knowledge may proceed (at least in part) by way of relatively simple 
associative learning mechanisms.    
 
4. Top-down effects on binding 
 
The previous sections have highlighted the roles of predictive and retrospective processes in 
producing intentional binding and possibly the sense of agency. They have also considered 
the relationship between intentionality and causality in intentional binding. In particular some 
of these studies highlighted the role of learned associations that result in outcome 
expectations (i.e., predictions). Expectations can be considered as ‘top-down’ knowledge, 
gained through previous experience that guides experience of the self and other aspects of the 
environment. To address the more general role of top-down processes, several studies have 
specifically sought to investigate the influence of beliefs on intentional binding.  
 
4.1. The influence of causal beliefs on binding 
 
In one study, Desantis, Roussel and Waszak (2011) investigated the effects of causal belief 
about context on intentional binding. In their experiment they induced participants to believe 
that they were responsible for producing a tone with their action, or that their partner was 
responsible, or that the cause of the tone was ambiguous. The authors showed that a prior 
causal belief that “I” will be responsible for the tone increased the degree of binding shown 
compared to causal belief that the other person would be responsible for producing the tone. 
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In actual fact, the participant’s action always caused the tone, only the belief was manipulated 
by way of a pre-movement cue indicating that they would be responsible, or that the other 
person would be responsible, or that either person could be responsible. As alluded to earlier, 
intentional binding seems to be linked to mechanisms involved with predicting the sensory 
consequences of self-produced actions. Given this assumption, the results of Desantis et al 
suggest that a causal belief can directly affect the relatively low-level sensori-motor 
processes that are thought to (at least partially) mediate binding, or can at least affect the 
output of a comparator that assesses actual sensory feedback in the light of predicted sensory 
feedback. This study builds upon what is known about intentional binding and its relationship 
to the sense of agency by confirming that there are at least three sources of information that 
contribute to binding; 1. High-level beliefs about the context, 2. The operation of internal 
models involved in prediction of action outcomes, 3. Information made available after action 
onset (post-dictive information). What remains to be investigated is exactly what types of 
high level belief and post-dictive information modulate binding and more importantly, 
exactly how binding emerges from the three sources of information outlined. Across the 
studies reviewed so far, the emerging picture points to a process that integrates available 
sources of information to compute agency and register motor experience. 
 
4.2. Intentional binding and attention 
 
In a natural extension of the original binding study Haggard and Cole (2007) investigated the 
role of attention in intentional binding and whether binding occurs for intervals between 
intentions and action effects, or whether the phenomenon is limited to intervals between 
actions and their effects. Recall that one view holds that (causal) intentions are real 
precursors to actions and that they arise prior to movement out of the neural processes 
involved in motor preparation (predictive account, also known as the pre-constructionist 
account). On the other hand, reconstructive accounts such as that proposed by Wegner and 
colleagues (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), suggest that the experience of 
causation (of actions and effects) is generated post-hoc, on the basis of a particular sequence 
of thoughts, actions and effects, within the constraints of priority, consistency and exclusivity 
(see earlier discussion). Specifically, the re-constructionist view predicts that post-movement 
effects should influence the conscious experience of intentions. To examine this, Haggard & 
Cole used the Libet method and asked participants to judge the onset of the intention, the 
action, or the sensory effect (a tone). In addition, to assess the effect of focused attention on 
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binding, in some conditions, participants were not told which event to judge until the end of 
the trial. This clearly prevents the participant from strategically attending to one of the three 
possible critical events (intention, action, effect). Finally, to investigate the potential role of 
reafferent signals, binding was also assessed in a de-afferented patient in movements of an 
effector with no functional re-afferent projections (finger) and an effector with intact re-
afference (jaw). Hence, there were several questions posed in this study and several important 
results emerged.  
 
First, temporal judgments of intentions were not affected by action outcomes, whereas as 
with previous demonstrations, the judgment of actions was affected by the presence of a 
sensory effect. Second, intentional binding seems not to depend on focussed attention to a 
particular event as, when participants were prevented from focussing attention in this way, 
they showed a very strong binding effect in which percepts of the three events converged on 
an almost single point in time. Lastly, the de-afferented patient demonstrated binding 
suggesting that efferent signals, but not re-afferent signals were sufficient to trigger 
intentional binding in this case.  
 
4.3. Action inhibition and binding  
 
In another study of top-down modulation of binding, Haggard, Poonian and Walsh (2009) 
applied the intentional binding measure (operationalized in this experiment as a perceived 
shift of the tone back toward the action) to scenarios in which an intentional action was 
followed by a tone, and to scenarios in which an intentional action was endogenously 
cancelled but nevertheless a tone either linked to the originally intended action, or not linked 
to the originally intended action, occurred. To be clear, voluntary inhibition of an action is a 
top-down process in which a “high level” decision has to be made to withhold the planned 
action. The main result from the study was a perceived shift of the tone back toward the 
action for intentional actions that were followed by tones (i.e., a replication of classic 
intentional binding), but a trend toward a reversal of this effect (i.e., a shift of the perceived 
time of the tone away from the action) for trials in which an intentional action was inhibited, 
but nevertheless a tone was delivered. The authors suggested that endogenous inhibition of 
action results in an updated prediction that the effect should not occur. 
 
5. Intentional binding in patients 
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Disordered experiences of agency are characteristic of certain psychiatric and neurological 
disorders. Given the putative link between intentional binding and the sense of agency, 
intentional binding offers a useful paradigm for exploring the aberrant cognitive and neural 
processes underpinning these unusual experiences. 
 
In the first intentional binding patient study, Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod and 
Franck (2003) compared the magnitude of intentional binding in patients with schizophrenia 
to a healthy control group. They found that intentional binding was significantly stronger in 
patients compared to controls. This finding was surprising because schizophrenia patients 
suffering from unusual experiences of agency typically report feeling less in control of their 
actions. This would have been expected to manifest itself in the form of significantly weaker 
intentional binding compared with controls. Although unexpected, this finding has been 
replicated in subsequent patient studies (Voss et al., 2010). This hyper-binding effect has also 
been induced in healthy controls following infusion of the drug ketamine (Moore, Turner, 
Corlett, et al., 2011). Ketamine is an anaesthetic agent which acts as an NDMA-receptor 
antagonist. At sub-anaesthetic levels it has been shown to produce a state that resembles 
schizophrenia is several key ways (Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett, Honey, Krystal, 
& Fletcher, 2010). Ketamine is therefore a useful drug model of schizophrenic illness. 
Moore, Turner, Corlett, et al. (2011) showed that intentional binding was significantly 
stronger in participants on ketamine compared with their own performance on a placebo. This 
replicates the hyper-binding found in patients with schizophrenia. Although hyper-binding is 
unexpected given the typical self-reports from patients with schizophrenia, it appears to be a 
robust finding. It is also consistent with other data from patients with schizophrenia based on 
experiments using different agency paradigms: these also show a tendency for patients to 
hyper-associate their actions and outcomes and to over-attribute the consequences of their 
movements to themselves (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck, Farrer, et al., 2001). These findings 
highlight the complex relationship between putative measures of the sense of agency, such as 
intentional binding, and higher-level experiences of agency. 
 
Although changes in the magnitude of intentional binding are informative, this paradigm also 
allows us to investigate specific neurocognitive impairments that may contribute to the 
aberrant sense of agency in schizophrenia. Using Moore and Haggard’s (2008) probability 
paradigm described above, Voss et al (2010) found that the predictive contribution to 
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intentional binding was absent in patients with schizophrenia. They also found that the 
inferential contribution was stronger in patients. Intriguingly the magnitude of the predictive 
deficit in patients correlated with the severity of certain positive symptoms. The deficit in 
prediction observed on this task is consistent with Frith’s model of delusions, the so-call 
‘comparator model’. This model emphasises the role of aberrant sensorimotor prediction in 
the genesis of delusions. Closer inspection of Voss et al’s data sheds further light on the 
nature of this predictive deficit. Rather than it being due to a total absence of prediction on 
‘action only’ trials in both outcome probability conditions, these data show that it was due to 
strong prediction on ‘action only’ trials in both outcome probability conditions. Crucially the 
strength of prediction was not increased in the 75% condition. What this suggests is that 
patients were generating imprecise predictions rather than no predictions. That is, the strength 
of outcome prediction was not related to the objective likelihood of the outcome and instead, 
predictions were equally strong in the high and low outcome probability conditions.  
Imprecise prediction has also been observed in a separate study using a different agency 
paradigm (Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010). Imprecise sensorimotor 
prediction may explain the stronger retrospective contribution to intentional binding in 
patients: given unreliable internal sensorimotor predictions, the patients’ experience of 
agency may be strongly influenced by the more reliable external cues to agency. This can be 
captured by the optimal cue integration model introduced by Moore, Wegner and Haggard 
(2009), where the influence of cues is determined by their reliability.     
 
Intriguingly, the pattern of predictive deficits in intentional binding seems to change during 
the progression of schizophrenic illness. Using the aforementioned probability paradigm, 
(Hauser et al., 2011) explored possible deficits in prediction and inference in a group of 
patients in the prodromal phase of psychotic illness. These were patients who presented with 
psychotic-like symptoms, but who did not yet meet full diagnostic criteria. Unlike patients 
with full-blown schizophrenic illness, these prodromal patients showed augmented predictive 
contributions to intentional binding. The authors suggested that these findings, hyper-
prediction in the psychotic prodrome and hypo-prediction in established schizophrenic 
illness, were consistent with recent models of delusion formation emphasising the role of 
aberrant error signalling mediated by glutamatergic and dopaminergic pathways in the brain 
(Corlett, Honey & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). In the early 
stages of the disease, augmented error signalling, mediated by glutamatergic pathways, could 
strengthen action-outcome associations leading to stronger predictions. Subsequent 
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dysregulation of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the later stages of the disease could 
corrupt error signalling by introducing noise to that signal. This would lead to the formation 
of strong and indiscriminate action-outcome associations leading to strong and indiscriminate 
(or noisy) predictions.   
 
The importance of dopaminergic neurotransmission for intentional binding was established in 
another patient study, this time in patients with Parkinson’s disease.. Parkinson’s disease is 
particularly interesting in the context of agency research because disturbances in willed 
behaviour are both a consequence of the disease and a common side-effect of dopaminergic 
drug treatment used to treat the symptoms of the disease. Moore et al. (2010) used a drug 
withdrawal paradigm to investigate intentional binding in patients both off and on their 
dopaminergic drug therapy. The magnitude of intentional binding in Parkinson’s patients off 
medication was statistically identical to a group of aged-matched controls. However, when 
patients were on medication intentional binding was significantly stronger than in controls 
and also the patients’ own performance off medication. This suggests that dopaminergic drug 
therapy exaggerated the sense of agency in these patients. This is a fascinating result as 
impulse control disorders are a relatively common side-effect of medication. The authors 
suggested that the exaggerated sense of agency may be an important factor in the 
development of impuse control disorders – if a patient feels their actions are highly effective 
they may be less likely to inhibit them in future. The modulation of intentional binding by 
dopaminergic medication also shows that dopaminergic pathways are relevant to intentional 
binding. Given the role of dopaminergic neurotransmission in associative learning, this 
finding is consistent with previous data described above showing that intentional binding is 
sensitive to a modified blocking procedure (Moore, Dickinson & Fletcher, 2011).  
 
The studies reviewed in this section show that intentional binding is a useful paradigm for 
exploring aberrant experiences of agency in certain psychiatric and neurological disorders. 
Most of the work carried out so far has focussed on schizophrenic illness. This work has 
shown aberrant performance on intentional binding tasks in patients with schizophrenia and 
those in the psychotic prodrome. The ketamine study by Moore et al (2011) also suggests that 
this drug may be a useful model of aberrant experiences of agency associated with the 
disease, particularly its early stages. Finally, the work on Parkinson’s disease patients by 
Moore et al (2010) demonstrates the potential utility of exploring intentional binding in other 
disorders where there are deficits in the performance or experience of willed action.   
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6. Brain basis of intentional binding 
 
Few studies have explicitly considered the neural basis of intentional binding. The studies 
described previously detailing intentional binding in patients have implicated dopaminergic 
(Moore et al., 2010) and glutamatergic pathways (Moore et al., 2011). The role of these 
pathways is likely to be in regulating learning processes involved in intentional binding.  
 
In terms of specific brain structures supporting intentional binding, the only study that has 
directly addressed this is Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell and Haggard (2010). They used 
continuous theta burst stimulation to explore the brain basis of intentional binding. 
Continuous theta burst stimulation is a repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation protocol 
that is known to suppress neural activity in the stimulated region for up to 60 minutes 
(Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005). Moore and colleagues investigated the 
contribution of two specific target sites: the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and 
primary motor cortex (M1). The pre-SMA is involved in higher-order cognitive aspects of 
self-generated action (Picard & Strick, 2001) and with the conscious experience of intending 
to act (Fried et al., 1991). In this sense it is likely to support predictive contributions to 
intentional binding. On the other hand, M1 processes signals that are involved in actual motor 
execution, signals that the authors suggest are required to support inferences of agency. In 
this sense disrupting the processing of these signals would be expected to impact on 
inferential contributions to intentional binding. The effect of stimulation of these target 
regions was compared with stimulation of a control site, sensory leg area. It was found that 
only stimulation of pre-SMA led to a significant reduction in intentional binding. Stimulation 
of M1 marginally reduced intentional binding, but this effect was not significant. The authors 
therefore concluded that pre-SMA is likely to play a key role in intentional binding. Because 
continuous theta burst stimulation only significantly reduced the binding of the outcome to 
the action, the authors also suggest that the role of pre-SMA may be to pre-emptively link 
intentions to the sensory consequences of action. Although this study is informative, more 
work needs to be done in order to establish the neural basis of intentional binding. 
Furthermore, it is possible that, rather than MI or pre-SMA subtending a specific component 
of intentional binding (predictive or inferential), these areas form part of a wider network of 
structures that support intentional binding. 
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7. How does voluntary action modulate time perception? 
 
It is clear from the studies reviewed so far that intentional binding is a robust phenomenon 
surrounding voluntary action. Whilst patient work has revealed intriguing patterns of 
intentional binding in schizophrenics and neural intervention approaches have highlighted the 
role of regions involved in motor preparation in intentional binding, the fundamental question 
of why exactly voluntary action modulates time perception remains. In one attempt to address 
this question, Wenke and Haggard (2009) performed an elegant study in which they proposed 
two broad classes of possible explanations for intentional binding.  
 
First, the effect could be due to changes in the rate of an internal clock, such that intentional 
binding is simply a result of a slowing of internal clock rate. Within this broad class of 
explanation, there are further possibilities, one involving a constant change of clock rate over 
the whole action-effect interval, and the other involving a transient change in clock rate after 
the voluntary action. Second, the effect could be due to a recalibration of the perceived onset 
of sensory events such that, for example, tones are pre-dated to maintain perceptual 
constancy, causal relations, or even agency.  These two broad classes of potential 
mechanisms both predict an intentional binding effect for voluntary compared to passive 
actions, but make different predictions regarding the temporal discrimination of two sensory 
events occurring within the interval (no difference in temporal discrimination between active 
and passive movements for recalibration mechanism; change in temporal discrimination 
between active and passive movements for clock rate mechanism). The authors exploited this 
by including a temporal discrimination of shocks task either early in the action-effect interval 
or late in the interval.  
 
By examining patterns of intentional binding and temporal discrimination of shocks, the 
authors demonstrated that a recalibration of the time of sensory events does not explain 
intentional binding, and neither does a constant slowing of clock rate during the entire action-
effect interval. Rather, they found support for the idea that clock rate slows transiently and 
very briefly after a voluntary action and then speeds up again to compensate. To be clear, this 
is borne out by the fact that they found increased temporal discrimination thresholds for 
active movements compared to passive movements only when discrimination stimuli were 
delivered early after voluntary action and not when the stimuli were delivered late in the 
action effect interval. These results suggest that intentional binding may be due to transient 
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slowing of an internal clock that then accelerates to return to its initial rate, and is not the 
result of a re-calibration of the timing of sensory events themselves.  
 
Despite the elegance of this experimental approach, it must be borne in mind that changes of 
internal clock rate represent just one mechanism by which voluntary action might modulate 
time perception. Hence, this initial result should be interpreted cautiously. For example, 
Moore & Haggard (2008) demonstrated that intentional binding appears to occur due to 
recalibration in the absence of sensorimotor prediction. Furthermore, previous work has 
shown that the system is capable of recalibration in a very similar task environment. 
Specifically, Stetson et al (2006) showed that after adaptation to a fixed action-effect delay, 
effects that were delivered much earlier than the adapted latency, but still after the action, 
were perceived to occur prior to the action. This illusory perception provides evidence that 
motor-sensory recalibration is indeed possible. Bearing these results in mind, Wenke & 
Haggard’s initial attempt at identifying explanatory mechanisms underlying intentional 
binding is a welcome first step, but further experiments are warranted to fully determine 
whether or not a recalibration process contributes to intentional binding. The key point that 
emerges is that intentional binding can be influenced (and presumably mediated) by a number 
of factors, and that the precise nature of intentional binding in any given situation is probably 
a function of the specific task demands and the prevailing environmental context. 
 
8. Binding and explicit agency  
 
As mentioned earlier, intentional binding may represent an implicit measure of sense of 
agency. However, several authors have highlighted the multi-level nature of the sense of 
agency by referring to explicit (i.e., reflective) agency and low level (i.e., pre-reflective) 
agency (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; Obhi & 
Hall, 2011a;b). At present though, it is unclear whether intentional binding and explicit 
agency are mediated by common or separable mechanisms, or whether similar brain areas are 
involved in the underlying computations. Recently however, several authors have started to 
investigate the potential relationship between these forms of agency. 
 
For example, in two experiments, Ebert and Wegner (2010) investigated the relationship 
between intentional binding and explicit self-reported feelings of authorship. Citing the 
failure of previous studies to examine both these forms of agency indicators, the authors 
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developed a relatively naturalistic paradigm that involved pulling and pushing a joystick in 
order to move on-screen objects toward or away from themselves. In their first experiment, 
participants saw pictures of everyday objects such as an apple, and then pushed or pulled the 
joystick. On some ‘pull’ trials the apple appeared to move towards the participant, and hence 
the motion of the object was congruent with their action, whereas in others there was an 
inconsistency in which the object moved away from the person when they pulled the joystick 
and toward the person when they pushed the joystick. In order to examine the effect of 
temporal delay on binding and perceived authorship, the authors also employed three 
different actual delays (100, 400 and 700 ms). Intentional binding was measured using the 
interval estimation method. Explicit agency was measured by asking participants to report the 
extent to which they felt their movement had caused the movement of the object, on a 7-point 
likert scale. 
 
The results showed that estimated intervals were briefer for consistent compared to 
inconsistent trials and that perceived authorship was greater for consistent versus inconsistent 
trials. While the binding measure and the perceived authorship measure were both taken on 
every trial in experiment 1, these measures were taken in separate blocks in experiment 2, in 
order to reduce the likelihood of one measure ‘contaminating’ the other. Overall, the results 
from both experiments showed that action-effect consistency affects binding and perceived 
authorship. However, and importantly, the results also showed that perceived authorship 
effects were relatively strong at longer action-effect delays compared to binding measures, 
which were stronger for shorter delays. Interestingly, the majority of participants were also 
unaware that their interval estimates were different for consistent versus inconsistent action-
effect pairings. On the basis of their results, the authors claimed that binding occurs in 
situations where perceived authorship is experienced and that these two forms of authorship 
indicator are mediated by at least partially dissociable mechanisms that operate over different 
time courses.   
 
9. Intentional binding in social contexts 
 
The majority of intentional binding experiments have been conducted in settings where 
individuals act alone. In this respect they have perhaps fallen prey to what Richardson has 
called the “experimental quarantine” approach (Richardson et al., 2008). In many everyday 
situations, individuals do not act in isolation but rather act in social contexts, in many cases 
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even making “joint actions” with others. Just two examples are factory workers working 
together to assemble products and members of special operations teams acting in concert to 
effectively neutralise a threat. Very little is known about the phenomenology of agency and 
the occurrence of intentional binding in joint action situations. A key question concerns how 
the sense of agency changes in social settings when more than one agent is involved in 
bringing about an environmental change. Although still an understudied issue, some authors 
have begun to investigate the sense of agency and intentional binding in actions occurring in 
social contexts. 
 
In an attempt to further understand the determinants of intentional binding, Engbert, 
Wohlschläger, Thomas and Haggard (2007) contrasted actions that caused somatic effects to 
the actor with those that caused somatic effects to another agent. The authors were 
specifically interested in whether binding is more dependent on the production of actions or 
experience of the sensory consequences of those actions. To shed light on this issue they 
employed a 2x2 design (action production: self, other; somatic effect: self, other). In their 
first experiment they showed that there was more binding when participants moved than 
when the experimenter moved, and there was no influence of who experienced the effect on 
binding. That is, binding was similar regardless of whether the participant’s action produced 
a passive movement of their own finger or of the experimenter’s finger. In their second 
experiment, the authors included a baseline condition comprising movement of a rubber hand 
and a non-somatic effect applied to the rubber hand. Again, the authors found that binding 
was stronger for self-produced movements and was independent of where the somatic effect 
occurred. That is, for self produced movements, somatic effects delivered to the participant’s 
hand, the experimenter’s hand or the rubber hand produced similar levels of binding. In 
experiment 3, the authors ruled out the possibility that the difference in binding between self 
and other movement conditions was due to temporal predictability of the action. Lastly, in 
experiment 3 the authors also found that intentional binding was greatest when the effect was 
applied to the rubber hand, suggesting a special significance of actions that cause effects in 
the external world, as opposed to somatic effects to the body, or the body of another. 
 
Engbert, Wohlschläger,, and Haggard (2008) examined whether binding effects were similar 
or different for intentional actions, passive actions and observed actions of another individual, 
and whether binding is affected by the modality in which a sensory effect occurs. In their first 
experiment they assessed intentional binding when participants made active or passive 
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actions that were followed by auditory tones, or watched another agent making active or 
passive actions that were followed by auditory tones. In observed active movements of the 
other agent, the same motor that was used in the passive action conditions initiated the action, 
but participants were not aware of this. Results clearly showed that participants judged the 
interval between the movement and the consequent tone to be shorter in trials involving their 
own intentional actions compared to passive movements of their own hand. This was not the 
case for observed action conditions. In particular, intervals involving actions of the other 
agent were generally longer than those from conditions involving movement of the 
participants’ body, and there was no difference in the intervals between active and passive 
movement conditions of the other agent. The authors also demonstrated this pattern of 
intentional binding effects for active actions that were followed by somatic (passive actions 
of their own body) or visual effects, hence confirming that the binding effect is generalisable 
across different sensory modalities, and seems to depend on intentional action.  
 
The two studies outlined above pertain to situations involving two individuals but do not 
actually address intentional binding in situations where two individuals act together to 
produce an effect. In the first study to examine intentional binding in “joint action” contexts 
Strother, House and Obhi (2010) used the Libet method and set up a task in which two 
individuals sat side by side and performed key presses on either end of a space bar. Each 
participant rested their right index finger on force sensitive resistor at one end of a spacebar 
and they were requested to press the spacebar at a time of their own choosing. An additional 
instruction was that if the other person pressed the bar, their partner should simply let their 
finger move down with the key but exert no force themselves. Explicit agency judgments and 
intentional binding was assessed on each trial. Interestingly, intentional binding was similar 
and indistinguishable for the initiator and the passive mover, despite the fact that only the 
initiator claimed any explicit agency for the action-effect. The authors pointed out that 
intentional binding occurred for the passive mover despite the fact that no change in the 
output of the force sensitive resistor was seen. This shows that intentional binding can occur 
in the absence of privately held efferent information and also that intentional binding and the 
explicit sense of agency can be dissociated (c.f., Ebert & Wegner, 2010).  The same results 
were found in a blocked condition in which one participant was told not to intend to make an 
action at all and in conditions where the initiator emerged dynamically based on who pressed 
the spacebar first. What separates this experimental paradigm from others is that it was 
obtained in a specific scenario involving two individuals acting together. Hence, it may be 
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that such cases of “joint action” represent a special class of action contexts, in which private 
efferent information is not the primary trigger for the occurrence of intentional binding. 
 
In other recent experiments, Obhi & Hall (2011a) manipulated the social role of the partners 
in a similar joint action task so that one was a leader and the other was a follower. In this 
experiment the person who emerged as a follower was instructed to press the key as fast as 
possible in response to the leader’s key press. In other conditions the role (leader, follower) 
was assigned at the beginning of the block and remained constant. Again, intentional binding 
was found for both individuals, regardless of whether they felt an explicit sense of agency or 
not. To be clear, even when the follower explicitly claimed no responsibility for the key press 
and subsequent effect, they demonstrated the same degree of intentional binding as the 
initiator, who did experience explicit agency.   
 
In a further recent study, Obhi & Hall (2011b) used a similar task to compare the effects of 
being paired with a human or with a computer. Specifically, in this experiment participants 
sat side by side with another person (a confederate) and were unable to see them (a curtain 
separated them). The genuine participant and the confederate were seated in front of laptop 
computers and were instructed to make silent index finger touches of the touchpad and report 
the time of the touch (and in some conditions a tone that followed) using the Libet method. 
After each movement-tone complex a coloured dot was provided as feedback about whose 
action had actually caused the tone. This feedback was false, as in reality the experimental 
participant’s action always caused the tone. Explicit reports of agency revealed that 
participants always aligned with the feedback, but as in previous experiments, the participants 
showed intentional binding even when they explicitly believed the other person had caused 
the tone. In a further variation, the participant was told that their partner was a computer that 
would simulate the actions of a person and that could cause tones in an identical fashion. In 
this case, the effects of belief about the partner had dramatic effects on intentional binding. 
Whilst the participant still always aligned with the feedback in their explicit judgments 
(saying that they were responsible for the tone when the feedback indicated this, and that the 
computer was responsible for the tone when the feedback indicated that), they never showed 
intentional binding. Thus, when paired with a computer, even when participants explicitly 
knew they caused an effect, they did not show intentional binding. This result opens up a new 
line of investigation into how the sense of agency emerges in human-machine interactions. 
This is a promising and very topical area for future research. 
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On the basis of their joint action experiments Obhi et al (2011a;b) suggested that, when 
paired with another human, a new “we” identity is automatically formed. In this situation 
both individuals experience pre-reflective agency (i.e., demonstrate intentional binding) for 
any action produced by either partner. However, at a higher reflective level of processing 
they still believe that only one person caused the tone. Critically, this automatic formation of 
a new agentic identity seems not to occur when the other “person” is a machine, and 
furthermore individual agency experience also seems to break down in this scenario. Further 
experiments seem warranted to investigate the sense of agency and intentional binding in 
joint human actions and joint human-machine actions.  
 
10. Conclusions and future directions 
 
As this review has highlighted, since the seminal paper in which intentional binding was 
reported in 2002, many studies investigating the factors that affect intentional binding have 
been published, with a robust pattern of effects. Furthermore, interest in intentional binding 
and the sense of agency more generally appears to be growing which provides hope of deeper 
insights in the not too distant future. Whilst considerable progress has been made in 
determining how intentional binding is affected by a host of manipulations, it is fair to say 
that a comprehensive understanding of the intentional binding effect and particularly its 
relationship to the sense of agency has not yet been fully achieved. What has been shown is 
that there is a reliable link between intentional binding and the presence of efferent 
information (but recall the apparent exception of joint action).  
 
It has also been conclusively demonstrated that other sources of information such as actual 
sensory feedback, outcome expectations and causal beliefs all modulate the degree of 
binding, and that the effects of these variables seem to depend on the exact task-operator 
characteristics. This idea has been formalised in the optimal cue integration theory (Moore, 
Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), which, in our view, represents the most parsimonious and simple 
account of how intentional binding - and more broadly, the sense of agency - arises in 
humans. This theory is outlined in detail in a recent paper by Moore and Fletcher (in press). 
Briefly, it posits that a range of different agency cues contribute to the sense of agency and 
that the influence of these cues is dependent on their reliability. This is a statistically optimal 
solution based on the maximum likelihood estimation rule (Ernst & Banks, 2002; see also 
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Moore & Fletcher, in press, for how this relates to sense of agency). These agency cues 
include, but are not limited to, efferent motoric information; proprioceptive information; 
action consequences; and the social context of action (see Wegner & Sparrow, 2004, and 
Synofzik et al., 2008, for a more extensive discussion of different agency cues). This optimal 
cue integration approach is able to account for patterns of agency experience from a range of 
studies, including those that have used the intentional binding paradigm. Importantly, it can 
explain patterns of agency experience associated with certain neurological and psychiatric 
diseases. For example, the sense of agency in patients with schizophrenia appears to be 
characterised by noisy sensorimotor prediction (Voss et al., 2010; Synofzik et al., 2010). 
Moreover, external sensory cues to agency dominate sense of agency in these patients. 
Optimal cue integration can explain this: external sensory cues to agency are more reliable 
than noisy sensorimotor prediction and will therefore dominate sense of agency in patients 
with schizophrenia.  
 
Out of all the factors that have been linked to intentional binding, it appears that the presence 
of efferent information is most central to the manifestation of intentional binding as, when 
efferent information is not present, such as in passive movement conditions, or passive 
observation of others, intentional binding is reduced or absent. The key role of efferent 
information and the similarly strong role of efference-based prediction in neurocognitive 
accounts of agency perhaps provide the greatest theoretical link between intentional binding 
and the sense of agency. However, as we have highlighted in this paper, there are exceptions 
to this. It is these exceptions which have, at least in part, motivated the development of cue 
integration models of the sense of agency. One such exception seems to be joint action 
contexts where private efferent information is not required for the expression of intentional 
binding. This result has been discussed with reference to a potential “we” identity that is 
formed whenever two individuals (even nominally) act together to produce some outcome. A 
topic for future investigation concerns why it should be that, in some cases, private efferent 
information is not necessary for intentional binding to occur. 
  
In contrast to the apparently strong roles of efference, sensory feedback, causal beliefs, and 
intentionality in intentional binding, what is much less clear from the work done so far is 
exactly what the relationship between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency 
actually is. On the one hand, there have been demonstrations of intentional binding and the 
explicit sense of agency co-occurring. On the other hand, there have been reports of 
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dissociations between intentional binding and the explicit sense of agency. At least two 
questions naturally arise: first, how does one go about validating a purportedly implicit 
measure of agency? That is, what are the necessary conditions that must be met in order for 
us to be confident that intentional binding really does index a pre-reflective sense of agency? 
Second, what exactly is the relationship between implicit agency (perhaps as indexed by 
intentional binding) and explicit reflective agency? Any account must be able to explain why 
the two measures sometimes co-occur and sometimes dissociate. These are hard issues to 
resolve. The complex relationship between intentional binding and explicit agency is further 
highlighted by the patient data in which schizophrenic patients show strong intentional 
binding but (often) weak explicit agency experience. There is an elegant explanation (see 
section 5.) To account for the stronger intentional binding expression in patients, but again, 
and critically, reconciling this with patient subjective experience remains a challenge.  
 
Another challenge for future research is to shed light on the specific neural mechanisms 
underlying intentional binding. No research has yet directly addressed this issue, although 
established theories concerning the mechanisms of binding more generally might be 
informative. These include ‘oscillation theories’ which, at the neuronal level, suggest that 
integration emerges from temporal synchronization of neural activities using neural 
oscillations as a binding mechanism (Engel & Singer, 2001).  Future research should explore 
the relevance of these ideas to intentional binding.  
 
Despite these issues it should be clear from the studies reviewed in this paper that, since it 
was first introduced almost a decade ago, intentional binding has stimulated an impressive 
array of research and has moved us towards a better understanding of human agency. The 
challenge for the next decade of research is to further our understanding of the causal 
mechanisms of binding, identify the brain networks involved in binding, and determine how 
binding, low-level (pre-reflective) agency and explicit (reflective) agency are related. These 
are difficult questions, but we are confident that, with the foundation that has been built over 
the last ten years, the next ten years of research on intentional binding and, more generally 
the sense of agency, will yield even deeper insights. 
 
Acknowledgements 
SSO holds funding from the Natural Sciences & Engineering Research Council of Canada 
that enable his work in this area. 
33 
 
 
 
34 
 
References 
 
Balleine, B. W., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Goal-directed instrumental action: contingency and 
incentive learning and their cortical substrates. Neuropharmacology, 37(4-5), 407–
419. 
Blakemore, S., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 237-242. 
Blakemore, S.-J., Frith, Chris D., & Wolpert, Daniel M. (1999). Spatio-Temporal Prediction 
Modulates the Perception of Self-Produced Stimuli. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 11(5), 551-559. doi:10.1162/089892999563607 
Buehner, M. J., & Humphreys, G. R. (2009). Causal binding of actions to their effects. 
Psychological Science, 20(10), 1221. 
Corlett, P R, Honey, G D, & Fletcher, P C. (2007a). From prediction error to psychosis: 
ketamine as a pharmacological model of delusions. Journal of Psychopharmacology 
(Oxford, England), 21(3), 238-252. doi:10.1177/0269881107077716 
Corlett, P R, Honey, G D, & Fletcher, P C. (2007b). From prediction error to psychosis: 
ketamine as a pharmacological model of delusions. Journal of Psychopharmacology 
(Oxford, England), 21(3), 238-52. doi:10.1177/0269881107077716 
Corlett, Philip R, Honey, Garry D, Krystal, J. H., & Fletcher, Paul C. (2010). Glutamatergic 
Model Psychoses: Prediction Error, Learning, and Inference. 
Neuropsychopharmacology. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/npp.2010.163 
Cravo, A. M, Claessens, P. M.E, & Baldo, M. V.C. (2009). Voluntary action and causality in 
temporal binding. Experimental brain research, 199(1), 95–99. 
Cravo, A. M., Claessens, P. M. E., & Baldo, M. V. C. (2011). The relation between action, 
predictability and temporal contiguity in temporal binding. Acta Psychologica, 
136(1), 157-166. doi:16/j.actpsy.2010.11.005 
Daprati, E., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Proust, J., Pacherie, E., Dalery, J., & Jeannerod, M. 
(1997). Looking for the agent: an investigation into consciousness of action and self-
consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition, 65(1), 71-86. 
David, N., Newen, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008). The “sense of agency” and its underlying 
cognitive and neural mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 523-534. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.004 
Desantis, A., Roussel, C., & Waszak, F. (2011). On the influence of causal beliefs on the 
feeling of agency. Consciousness and Cognition. 
35 
 
Ebert, J. P., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of 
actions and events. Consciousness and cognition, 19(1), 481–489. 
Engbert, K., Wohlschläger, A., & Haggard, P. (2008). Who is causing what? The sense of 
agency is relational and efferent-triggered. Cognition, 107(2), 693–704. 
Engbert, K., Wohlschläger, A., Thomas, R., & Haggard, P. (2007). Agency, subjective time, 
and other minds. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 33(6), 1261. 
Engbert, Kai, & Wohlschläger, A. (2007). Intentions and expectations in temporal binding. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 16(2), 255-264. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.010 
Engel, A. K., & Singer, W. (2001). Temporal binding and the neural correlates of sensory 
awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 16-25. 
Ernst, M. O., & Banks, M. S. (2002). Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a 
statistically optimal fashion. Nature, 415(6870), 429–433. 
Franck, N., Farrer, C., Georgieff, N., Marie-Cardine, M., Daléry, J., d’ Amato, T., & 
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Defective recognition of one’s own actions in patients with 
schizophrenia. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 158(3), 454-9. 
Fried, I., Katz, A., McCarthy, G., Sass, K. J., Williamson, P., Spencer, S. S., & Spencer, D. 
D. (1991). Functional organization of human supplementary motor cortex studied by 
electrical stimulation. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the 
Society for Neuroscience, 11(11), 3656-66. 
Frith, C D, Blakemore, S. J., & Wolpert, D M. (2000). Abnormalities in the awareness and 
control of action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences, 355(1404), 1771-88. doi:10.1098/rstb.2000.0734 
Haggard, P., & Clark, S. (2003). Intentional action: conscious experience and neural 
prediction. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 695–707. 
Haggard, P., & Cole, J. (2007). Intention, attention and the temporal experience of action. 
Consciousness and cognition, 16(2), 211–220. 
Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002). Action, binding, and 
awareness. Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and 
Performance XIX, 266. 
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382–385. 
Haggard, P., Martin, F., Taylor-Clarke, M., Jeannerod, M., & Franck, N. (2003). Awareness 
of action in schizophrenia. Neuroreport, 14(7), 1081. 
36 
 
Haggard, P., Poonian, S., & Walsh, E. (2009). Representing the consequences of intentionally 
inhibited actions. Brain research, 1286, 106–113. 
Haggard, P, Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-5. doi:10.1038/nn827 
Hauser, M., Moore, J. W, de Millas, W., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., Haggard, P., & Voss, M. 
(2011). Sense of agency is altered in patients with a putative psychotic prodrome. 
Schizophrenia research, 126(1-3), 20–27. 
Huang, Y.-Z., Edwards, M. J., Rounis, E., Bhatia, Kailash P, & Rothwell, J. C. (2005). Theta 
burst stimulation of the human motor cortex. Neuron, 45(2), 201-6. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.12.033 
Hume, D. (1888). A treatise of human nature. In L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume’s Treatise of 
human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. (Original work 
published 1739). 
Humphreys, G. R., & Buehner, M. J. (2009). Magnitude estimation reveals temporal binding 
at super-second intervals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 35(5), 1542. 
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention 
to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious 
initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 106 (Pt 3), 623-
642. 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli with 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82(4), 276. 
Moore, J. W., & Fletcher, P. C. (in press). Sense of agency in health and disease: A review of 
cue integration approaches. Consciousness and Cognition. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.010 
Moore, J. W, Lagnado, D., Deal, D. C., & Haggard, P. (2009). Feelings of control: 
Contingency determines experience of action. Cognition, 110(2), 279–283. 
Moore, J. W, Ruge, D., Wenke, D., Rothwell, J., & Haggard, P. (2010). Disrupting the 
experience of control in the human brain: pre-supplementary motor area contributes to 
the sense of agency. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
277(1693), 2503. 
Moore, J. W, Schneider, S. A., Schwingenschuh, P., Moretto, G., Bhatia, K. P, & Haggard, P. 
(2010). Dopaminergic medication boosts action-effect binding in Parkinson’s disease. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(4), 1125–1132. 
37 
 
Moore, J. W, Turner, D. C., Corlett, P. R, Arana, F. S., Morgan, H. L., Absalom, A. R., 
Adapa, R., et al. (2011). Ketamine administration in healthy volunteers reproduces 
aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 99999(1), 1–18. 
Moore, J. W, Dickinson, A., & Fletcher, P. C. (2011). Sense of agency, associative learning, 
and schizotypy. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 792-800. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.01.002 
Moore, J. W, Wegner, D. M, & Haggard, P.. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with 
external cues. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(4), 1056-1064. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004 
Moore, J., & Haggard, P.. (2008). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 136-44. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004 
 
Morrone, M. C., Ross, J., & Burr, D. C. (1997). Apparent position of visual targets during 
real and simulated saccadic eye movements. Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 7941–7953.  
 
Obhi, S. S., & Hall, P. (2011). Sense of agency and intentional binding in joint action. 
Experimental Brain Research, 211, 655-62 
 
Obhi, S.S., & Hall, P. (2011). Sense of Agency in Joint Action: Influence of Human and 
Computer Co-actors. Experimental Brain Research, 211, 663-70. 
 
Pearce, J. M., & Hall, G. (1980). A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the 
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological Review, 
87(6), 532-552. 
Picard, N., & Strick, P. L. (2001). Imaging the premotor areas. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 11(6), 663-672. 
Reisberg, D. Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind, Norton, New York 
 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. H. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in 
the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. Classical conditioning II: 
Current research and theory, 64–99. 
Richardson DC, Hoover MA, Ghane A (2008) Joint perception: gaze and the presence of 
others. In: Love BC, McRae K, Sloutsky VM (eds) Proceedings of the 30th annual 
38 
 
conference of the cognitive science society. Cognitive Science Society, Austin, pp 
309–314 
Stetson, C., Cui, X., Montague, P. R., & Eagleman, D. M. (2006). Motor-sensory 
recalibration leads to an illusory reversal of action and sensation. Neuron, 51(5), 651-
9. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.08.006 
Strother, L., House, K. A., & Obhi, S. S. (2010). Subjective agency and awareness of shared 
actions. Consciousness and cognition, 19(1), 12–20. 
Synofzik, M., Thier, P., Leube, D. T., Schlotterbeck, P., & Lindner, A. (2010). 
Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about 
the sensory consequences of one’s actions. Brain, 133(1), 262. 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A 
multifactorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 219-
239. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010 
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2003). Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary 
action. Experimental Brain Research, 149(4), 439–446. 
Voss, M., Moore, J., Hauser, M., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., & Haggard, P. (2010). Altered 
awareness of action in schizophrenia: a specific deficit in predicting action 
consequences. Brain, 133(10), 3104. 
Wegner, D M, & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation. Sources of the experience 
of will. The American Psychologist, 54(7), 480-92. 
Wegner, D. M. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. 
Wegner, D. M. (2003). The mind’s best trick: how we experience conscious will. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 65-69. 
Wegner, D. M., & Sparrow, B. (2004). Authorship processing. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The 
Cognitive Neurosciences: 3rd Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1201-1209. 
Wenke, D., & Haggard, P. (2009). How voluntary actions modulate time perception. 
Experimental brain research, 196(3), 311–318. 
Wolpert, D M, & Ghahramani, Z. (2000). Computational principles of movement 
neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 3 Suppl, 1212-7. doi:10.1038/81497 
Yarrow, K., Haggard, P., Heal, R., Brown, P., & Rothwell, J. C. (2001). Illusory perceptions 
of space and time preserve cross-saccadic perceptual continuity. Nature, 414(6861), 
302-305. doi:10.1038/35104551 
 
 
39 
 
 
